We describe a structured system for distributed mechanism design. 
Introduction

Background and motivation
Mechanism design is an important area of economics. It aims at realizing economic interactions in which desired social decisions result when each agent is interested in maximizing his utility. The traditional approach relies on the existence of a central authority, who collects the information from the players, computes the decision and informs the players about the outcome and their taxes.
Recently, in a series of papers distributed mechanism design was suggested as a realistic alternative for the applications based on the Internet. In this setting no central authority exists and the decisions are taken by the players themselves. The challenge here is to appropriately combine the techniques of distributed computing with those that deal with the matters specific to mechanism design, notably rationality and truth-telling. * CWI, Amsterdam, Kruislaan 413, 1098 SJ Amsterdam, The Netherlands † University of Amsterdam ‡ University of Leiden, The Netherlands
Related work
A number of recent papers deal with different aspects of distributed mechanism design. An influential paper [5] introduced the notion of distributed algorithmic mechanism design emphasizing the issues of computational complexity and incentive compatibility in distributed computing. Next, [9] studied the distributed implementations of the VCG mechanism. However, in their approach there is still a center that is ultimately responsible for selecting and enforcing the outcome.
The authors of [11] considered the problem of creating distributed system specifications that will be faithfully implemented in networks with rational (i.e., self-interested) nodes so that no node will choose to deviate from the specification. Researchers of [10] introduced the first distributed implementation of the VCG mechanism. The only central authority required was a bank that is in charge of the computation of taxes. The authors also discussed a method to redistribute some of the VCG payments back to players.
Contributions
In this paper we propose a platform for distributed mechanism design. Our work is closest to [10] whose approach is based on distributed constraint programming. In contrast, our approach builds upon a very general view of distributed programming, an area that developed a variety of techniques appropriate for the problem at hand.
Our platform is built out of a number of layers. This leads to a flexible, hierarchical design in which the lower layers are concerned only with the matters relevant for distributed computing, such as communication and synchronization issues, and the upper layers that deal with the relevant aspects of the mechanism design, such as computation of the desired decision and taxes. Any specific application is realized simply as an instantiation of a top layer. This layered architecture offers a number of novel features and improvements to the approach of [10] , to wit
• we support open systems in which the number of players can be unknown, • the bank process of [10] is replaced by a weaker tax collector process. It is needed only for the mechanisms that are not balanced, wherein it is a passive process used only to receive messages to collect the resulting deficit, • fault-tolerance is supported, both on the message transmission level and on the player processes level,
• a multi-level protection against manipulations is provided, • our platform makes it possible to implement distributed policing that provides an alternative to a 'central enforcer' whose responsibility is to implement the outcome decided by the agents and collect the taxes (see, e.g., [4, page 366] ).
Fault-tolerance at the mechanism design level means that the final decision and taxes can be computed even after some of the processes that broadcast the player's types crash: the other processes then still can proceed. This is achieved by the duplication of the computation by all players. Such a redundancy is common in all approaches to fault-tolerance (and also used to prevent manipulations, see [4, page 366] ). It was intentionally avoided in [10] which aimed at minimizing the overall communication and computation costs. In our approach it allows the fastest process to 'dominate' the computation and move it forward more quickly.
Our platform can be easily customized to real-life applications. Using it players can engage in joint decision making by dynamically forming a network with no central authority, in which they know neither their neighbours nor the size of the network. Also it can be used for a repeated distributed decision making process, each round involving a different group of interested players. This design is implemented in Java.
Finally, a few words about the paper organization. In the next section we review the basic facts about the taxbased mechanisms, notably the Groves family of mechanisms. Then in Section 3 we discuss the issues that need to be taken care of when moving from the centralized taxbased mechanisms to distributed ones and what approach we took to tackle these issues. The details of our design and implementation are provided in Section 4.
Next, in Section 5, we discuss three important advantages of our design: security, distributed policing and faulttolerance. In Section 6 we discuss a number of examples of mechanisms that we implemented using our system. They include Vickrey auction with redistribution, two types of auctions and a sequential mechanism design. Then, in Section 7 we provide conclusions.
Preliminaries: mechanism design
We recall here briefly tax-based mechanisms, see, e.g., [7, Chapter 23] . Assume a set of decisions D, a set {1, . . . , n} of players, for each player a set of types Θ i and a utility function v i : D × Θ i → R. In this context a type is some private information known only to the player, for example a vector of player's valuations of the items for sale in a multi-unit auction.
A decision rule is a function f : Θ → D, where Θ := Θ 1 × · · · × Θ n . We call the tuple
and strategy-proof (or incentive compatible) if for all θ ∈ Θ, i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and θ
where
In mechanism design one is interested in the ways of inducing the players to announce their true types, i.e., in transforming the decision rules to the ones that are strategyproof. In tax-based mechanisms this is achieved by extending the original decision rule by means of taxes that are computed by the central authority from the vector of the received types, using players' utility functions.
Given a decision problem, in the classical setting, one considers then the following sequence of events, where f is a given, publicly known, decision rule: (i) each player i receives a type θ i , (ii) each player i announces to the central authority a type θ ′ i ; this yields a joint type
is a given function, and communicates to each player i the decision d and his tax t i . (iv) the resulting utility for player i is then
Each Groves mechanism is obtained using g(θ
, where for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
The importance of the Groves mechanisms is revealed by the following crucial result.
Groves Theorem Suppose the decision rule f is efficient. Then in each Groves mechanism the expanded decision rule (f, g) : Θ → D × R n is strategy-proof w.r.t. the utility functions u 1 , . . . , u n .
When for a given tax-based mechanism for all θ ′ we have
, the mechanism is called feasible (respectively, budget balanced). A special case of a feasible Groves mechanism, called Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism (in short VCG) is obtained by using h i (θ
Our approach
In our approach we relax a number of the assumptions made when introducing mechanism design. More specifically we assume that
• there is no central authority, • players interested in participating in a specific mechanism register to join an open system wherein that mechanism runs, • the players whose registration is accepted (request the underlying distributed communication layer to) broadcast their type to other players in the system, • once a registered player learns that he has received the types from all registered players, he computes the decision and the taxes, sends this information to other registered players and terminates his computation. As in all cited works, we also assume that there is no collusion among the players. This leads to an implementation of the mechanism design by means of distributed processes. The computation of the decision and of the taxes is carried out by the players themselves.
In our approach each player is represented by a process, in short a player process. A player who wishes to join a specific mechanism (e.g., an auction) must register with a local registry. Local registries are linked together in a network that satisfies the full reachability condition.
Once player process registration is successful, it joins the network of (registry and player) processes wherein a generic broadcast command is available. The implementation of this command relies only on the assumption that for each pair of players there is a path of neighbouring processes connecting them. This allows us to deal with arbitrary network topologies in a simple way. The broadcast messages are transmitted through paths managed in a lower layer which the player processes cannot access. This automatically prevents manipulation by player processes of messages originating from or destined for other players, a problem pointed out e.g. in [4, page 366] .
Each player process after broadcasting the player's type participates in a distributed termination detection algorithm (see, e.g., [8] ) the aim of which is to learn whether all players have indeed broadcast their types. If this algorithm detects termination, the player process knows that he indeed received all types, and in particular can determine at this stage the number of players. More generally, we use the distributed termination detection algorithm to detect the end of each phase of the distributed computation: registration, type broadcast, etc., i.e., for barrier synchronization, see, e.g., [1] .
Each player process uses the same, publicly known, decision rule f that he learns, for example from a public bulletin board, and as a result computes the same decision. Further, each player process applies f to the same input θ ′ and computes the same tax scheme tax(t 1 ), . . . tax(t n ) from the tax vector (t 1 , . . . , t n ), where tax(t j ) specifies the amounts that player j has to pay to other players and possibly the tax collector from his tax t j . All tax schemes tax(t 1 ), . . . tax(t n ) then determine 'who pays how much to whom'. The tax collector process is only needed for the mechanisms that are not budget balanced.
Implementation
Our distributed mechanism design system is implemented in Java and consists of about 12.5 K lines of Java code. The implementation follows the guidelines explained in the previous section. Figure 1 shows the overall architecture of our system and the different layers of software used in its implementation. Each entity in this architecture communicates, either through function calls or method invocations, only with its adjacent entities. Specific applications are realized by instantiating the crucial player process layer.
Low Level Communication
The Low Level Communication (LLC) layer supports (1) locally generated, globally unique process identifiers, and (2) reliable non-orderpreserving, asynchronous, targeted communication, exclusively through the exchange of passive messages between processes. The only means of communication between processes in LLC is through message passing, where no transfer of control takes place when messages are exchanged.
Successful send simply means that the message has been dispatched on its way to its specified target. 
Figure 1. Implementation architecture
details of the BTTF DTD algorithm lie beyond the scope of this paper and will be described elsewhere. All DTD algorithms determine termination using waves of special control messages, called tokens. They also require the designation of a single process as the initiator, which is responsible for initiating the waves. In the BTTF algorithm, the initiator is anonymous, i.e., no process (other than the initiator) knows who the initiator is.
The DTD functionality provided by the BTTF layer can be used for barrier synchronization as well as for termination detection.
High Level Communication and Registry
The High Level Communication (HLC) layer provides indirect, anonymous communication among the players in a distributed system. It includes a number of local registries whose mutual connectivity supports the full connectivity of the players necessary for broadcast. A player must sign-in at a local registry, after which it can use the other operations provided by the HLC layer to take part in the mechanism.
Each local registry is responsible for processing the registrations of the player processes according to the assumed registration criteria.
Player Process Specific applications are implemented using this top layer. It is built on top of the HLC layer and is used to implement specific actions of the players, in particular the computation of the decisions and taxes.
Tax Collector Software Interface
This layer is built on top of the HLC layer and provides the counterparts of the functions of the HLC layer to deal with the tax collector process registration.
Tax Collector Process
This layer is built on top of the Tax Collector Software Interface layer and is used to implement the actions of the tax collector which is in charge of collecting players' taxes. We omit the details.
Player GUI The interaction between the player (user) and the system is realized in this interface. The interaction is limited to the registration, type submission and tax reception. Figure 2 shows a mapping of the architectural elements described in the previous section to 'logical hosts'. The mapping is dynamic and hence unknown to players. In any concrete implementation one or more such logical hosts can represent the same actual physical host. The communications network, represented by the cloud shape, interconnects a number of hosts to provide the functionality described in the LLC layer in Section 4. The specific hosts connected to this network that concern us are a set of gateway hosts that run the BTTF and the HLC layers.
The ring of hosts around the core in Figure 2 contains the set of hosts that run the local registries. Every local registry has a primary connection to a gateway host in the core. Thus, the full reachability of the gateway hosts in the core ensures full reachability among local registries.
The next ring of hosts in Figure 2 contains hosts that run player processes. Each player process establishes an initial link (dotted lines) with a local registry (whose address it obtains from a local forum) to register. As part of this registration process, its local registry provides the address of a gateway host with which the player process then establishes its primary communication link (solid lines) for the rest of the game. Finally, the outermost ring in Figure 2 consists merely of computers that run GUI programs that link to their respective player processes. This 'ring structure' provides multiple forms of protection against manipulations by the players. The only messages that pass through a player process are the ones originating from or destined for that specific player. Furthermore, the end users have physical access only to the outermost hosts that run the GUI programs, which severely restricts the range of their potentially dangerous actions. Finally, the separation of the GUI programs from the player processes allows us to run the latter on hosts to which end users do not have physical access. Users can trust the security of the messages they exchange through a 'public' communications system, by relying on the encryption of the messages using the public key cryptography.
A dishonest user may attempt to alter the code of a player process so that it sends to some players a falsified decision or a falsified tax scheme. By policing we mean here a sequence of actions that will lead to the exclusion of such processes (that we call dishonest). The qualification 'distributed' refers to the fact that the policing is done by the player processes themselves, without intervention of any central authority. We call a player process honest if it multicasts a true tax scheme.
The difficulty in implementing distributed policing lies in the fact that dishonest processes may behave inconsistently. To resolve this problem we make use of registries that are assumed to be reliable. We then modify the sequence of actions of each player process so that it always computes the decision and the tax scheme but sends them only to its local registry. The local registry then dispatches the tax scheme on behalf of its sender to all player processes mentioned in the tax scheme. As a trusted intermediary, the registry ensures that the same tax scheme is sent to all player processes involved, and that no player process can send more than one tax scheme in a single phase.
The BTTF algorithm in the BTTF layer detects persistent process failures. The duplication of the computation by all players allows us to easily modify the design to support fault-tolerance at the mechanism design level.
Examples
We used our distributed mechanism design system in a number of test cases that we now briefly describe. Each of them, is implemented as an instantiation of the player process layer described in Section 4.
Vickrey auction with redistribution
In Vickrey auction there is a single object for sale which is allocated to the highest bidder who pays the second highest bid. We implemented the proposal of [3] in which the highest bidder redistributes some amounts from his payment to other players. This minimizes the overall tax. Due to space limitations we omit the details.
Unit demand auction
In this auction multiple items are offered for sale. We assume that there are n players and m ≤ n items and that each player submits a valuation for each item. The items should be allocated in such a way that each player receives at most one of them and the aggregated valuation is maximal. This auction can be modelled as the following decision problem: (θ i,1 , . . . , θ i,m ) ∈ Θ i is a vector of player i's valuations of the items for sale,
Decision rule f is efficient, so Groves Theorem applies. The decisions are computed using the Kuhn-Munkres algorithm to compute the maximum weighted matching, where the weight associated with the edge (j, i) is the valuation for item j reported by player i. In our implementation we used the Java source code available at http://adn.cn/blog/article.asp?id=49. To compute tax for player i according to the VCG mechanism this algorithm needs to be used again, to compute the maximum weighted matching with player i excluded.
Single minded auction
In this auction studied in [6] there are n players and m items, with each player only interested in a specific set of items. For simplicity we assume that each player i is only interested in a subsequence a i , . . . , b i of the items 1, . . . , m. We model this as the following decision problem:
• D = {f | f : P({1, . . . , m}) → {1, . . . , n}}, • Θ i = R + ; θ i ∈ Θ i is player i's valuation for the sequence a i , . . . , b i of the items, So, given an allocation f ∈ D the goods in the set {k | f (k) = j} are allocated to player j. Decision rule f is efficient and consequently Groves Theorem applies. The computations of the decision and of the taxes involve constructions of the maximum weighted matchings that are computed using a dynamic programming algorithm, details of which are omitted.
Other applications To test the versatility of our approach we also implemented a number of other examples, including Vickrey auction, decision making concerned with public projects (see [7, Chapter 23]), sequential Groves mechanisms studied in [2] , and Walker mechanism of [12] . The latter mechanism is not an instance of Groves mechanism and implements the decision not in dominant strategies but in a Nash equilibrium (see, e.g., [7] ).
We described here the design and implementation of a platform that supports distributed mechanism design. We believe that the proposed platform clarifies how the design of systems supporting distributed decision making can profit from sound principles of software engineering, such as separation of concerns and hierarchical design.
We found that the division of the software into layers resulted in a flexible design that could be easily customized to specific mechanisms. For example, our distributed implementation of Vickrey auction required modification of a module of only 60 lines of code. Additionally, this layered architecture offers a multi-level protection against manipulations, distributed policing and supports fault-tolerance.
We also provided evidence that software engineering in the area of multi-agent systems can profit from the techniques developed in the area of distributed computing, for example broadcasting in an environment with an unknown number of processes, distributed termination and barrier synchronization.
